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Abstract 
We examine the economic efficiency of incentive mechanisms used to promote renewable energy (RE) 
as a policy in the European Union.  We evaluate the financial performance of RE investments and 
employ real option theory to model and analyze their impact in liberalized markets for electricity. Our 
analysis concerns key European countries and uses five years of most recent historic electricity price 
data from 2009 to consider sensitivities around key parameters. As RE policies are presented as public 
goods to address environmental concerns, we explain how the financial performance of these policies 
strikes a balance between social costs and private benefits. We discuss the impact which RE may have 
upon market conditions under liberalized markets for electricity generation and whether incentive 
mechanisms should be re-calibrated in light of these results. For other regions, our research offers useful 
lessons on both the effectiveness and cost-efficiency in the design of schemes to incentivize RE.   
Keywords: Feed-in tariffs, Feed-in premiums, Real-Option Theory, Investor Returns 
1 INTRODUCTION 
In many regions of the world reducing the usage 
of fossil fuels through supporting the use of 
wind turbines, solar cells and other technologies 
is one of the most prominent objectives of 
energy policy, alongside security of supply, 
reliability of delivery and affordability. 
Meanwhile, concerns have been raised about the 
affordability of RE from the standpoint of 
consumers, business and industry. Given the 
presumption that such policy cannot be achieved 
without incentives and government support, at 
the heart of the affordability debate of renewable 
electricity generation is the question of support 
mechanisms and, therefore, it is important to 
understand how such support mechanisms 
should be designed and how extensive they 
should be. Using standard financial and 
economic theory, we evaluate the widely used 
RE support mechanisms as adopted by the 
largest economies of the European Union (EU), 
excluding the United Kingdom, and address 
their economic efficiency as manifested in the 
returns to investors in RE and social costs, 
including externalities. We take both the market 
value of incentives paid to investors and their 
total value to analyze the financial performance 
of RE under the various support mechanisms 
found across a number of EU countries and 
observe whether or not the returns provided 
were commensurate with the risks. Further, to 
examine the social optimality of such 
investments, we employ option theory to 
measure the indirect costs of RE comparing 
them with the private benefits earned by 
investors. We use representative plants, costs, 
localized operating characteristics, such as solar 
irradiance and historic country level electricity 
price data from 2009 to 2013. We also consider 
how changes to key parameters may impact the 
value of support for RE. The fact that Germany, 
Italy and Spain have recently revised their 
support schemes, lends weight to the growing 
perception that many schemes had design or 
calibration problems [1, 2, 3]. 
The paper is organized as follows: in 
section 2 we provide perspectives on the topic of 
RE support mechanisms and then turn to the 
efficiency of support mechanisms as covered in 
the public finance and environmental economics 
literature. Section 3 explains how we use 
financial option theory to model the exposure 
created through dispatch priority, as afforded to 
renewable generation, to address the issues 
raised in the literature review on the economic 
efficiency of RE incentive mechanisms social 
costs included. In section 4 we present 
measurements of the financial performance of 
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RE generation, both in terms of private benefits 
and social costs in order to observe the 
calibration of incentive support mechanisms in 
liberalized, traded markets for electricity. The 
concluding section relates our findings to some 
of the broader concerns and critiques of the EU 
energy and environmental policies. 
2 RE AS PUBLIC GOOD 
According to public finance theory, the nature 
and size of public goods need to be decided 
through collective or social decision making 
rather than through market processes [4]. RE is 
supported as a public good to correct the 
externalities associated with fossil fuels such as 
GHG, especially when effective taxation of CO2 
has proved difficult. To maximize social 
benefits and reduce social costs, various 
incentive mechanisms have been put forward to 
encourage investment in RE, particularly in 
wind turbine or photo voltaic electricity 
generation. But how may one quantify the social 
benefits of reducing GHG and determine by how 
much RE should be supported? Formally, the 
decision on how much of a public good should 
be produced requires finding the level of 
production which maximizes the difference 
between marginal social benefits and marginal 
social costs [5]. Given the global nature of GHG 
and atmospheric warming, it is difficult to apply 
this rule to decide how much RE is required. But 
with governments having set targets for RE 
investment and de-carbonization, such as the 
latest 2015 UN targets, we can ask how large 
incentives should be to achieve such objectives 
and ensure allocative efficiency, i.e. aligning 
private benefits with social costs. The literature 
on these issues exposes several research 
frameworks and opinions. 
2.1 Support Mechanisms and 
Instruments for RE: A Literature Review  
The premise of policy making in the design of 
effective support mechanisms for RE is that, 
although the short-run marginal cost of such 
generation is negligible, the fixed costs are very 
high compared to fossil fuel electricity 
generation and, therefore, RE would not be 
developed without incentives. The alternative of 
putting a price on CO2 and changing the merit 
order of dispatchable electricity generation has 
been attempted but, arguably, for many reasons 
has been unsuccessful [6]. In designing 
incentives for the liberalized markets of Europe 
and North America there are special challenges 
as one must rely upon markets to deliver 
renewable generation on public good grounds 
but the consensus varies on what works best [7].  
In traded electricity markets support 
mechanisms usually involve removing or 
modifying the various risks faced by renewable 
investors through combinations of guaranteed 
prices above a floating price, a fixed premium or 
uplift to a floating electricity price, and a transfer 
of risks to other parties or the greater system [8]. 
Indirect support may also be derived through the 
possibility of revenue from trading RE 
certificates [9]. What works best in delivering 
RE investment continues to be debated, 
although according to US Department of Energy 
National RE Laboratory [10], tariffs are more 
compatible with deregulated generation 
markets. In summary, there has been varied 
research into the effectiveness of policies in 
promoting renewable targets but a consensus has 
not emerged. Given the levels of renewable 
investment now achieved in Europe, North 
America and elsewhere, the focus of debate has 
shifted to the costs and efficiency of delivery 
mechanisms as explained below.   
 
2.2 Allocative Efficiency and RE 
The premise that deregulated and privatized 
markets for electricity require sufficient 
incentives to attract investors begs the issue of 
how to ensure economic efficiency in delivering 
policy goals. To achieve economic efficiency, 
various approaches have been used to calibrate 
the above mentioned schemes, including 
calibrating incentives (i) using the levelized cost 
of RE (LCOE); (ii) according to the avoided 
utility generation cost; (iii) based on the value of 
RE to society; (iv) using RE project costs plus a 
reasonable return; and (v) using an auction to 
calibrate the right to supply RE to promote price 
discovery and avoid economic rent [11]. 
Calibrated in different manners and 
often revised, the shear variety of such methods 
suggests a lack of consensus on how to deliver 
supply while avoiding economic rents, how to 
align social costs with private benefits and 
ensure economic efficiency. For example, a 
study of wind parks in Portugal, found that 
owners of such RE were over-compensated 
under the feed-in tariff scheme. The Portuguese 
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Authorities used a LCOE model to determine 
what they thought would be the necessary and 
appropriate level of support. The researcher 
showed that under the 2005 legislation $4.1bn 
was spent on feed-in tariff supports and, 
moreover, the 2013 legislation required another 
$840million of public spending upon wind 
energy supports [12]. In Ontario Canada, a 
debate over whether a support scheme for wind 
and solar RE should be cost or revenue-based 
was resolved by adopting the German approach 
to benchmark incentives for local wind and solar 
RE [13]. In numerous countries a surge in 
renewable investment has been followed by 
actions to reduce incentives, suggesting a 
divergence between how policy makers value 
subsidies such as feed-in tariffs or premiums, 
and how the markets and investors may see them 
[14, 15]. 
To calibrate a support mechanism to 
ensure its economic efficiency, we need to 
compare the direct cost of the incentive price 
against the market price, as well as any indirect 
costs given the nature of RE and the market 
setting. The intermittency of RE and the lack of 
dispatchability need to be considered in the 
valuation of renewables because electricity is 
not storable thus its price varies depending on 
when it is produced. In deregulated, liberalized 
markets, electricity is usually priced hourly or 
half-hourly. The common method of comparing 
renewables with fossil fuels generation uses 
LCOE and treats electricity as a homogenous 
good and power supply from different fuels and 
technologies as commoditized perfect 
substitutes. This is problematic, however, 
because it ignores temporal and spatial issues 
and their consequent system impact [16, 17].  
To tackle the system costs created by 
RE, the US Department of Energy recently 
proposed a new metric: Levelized Avoided Cost 
of Energy (or, LACE) to measure the economic 
merits of renewables including the cost to the 
grid or system to generate the electricity that is 
otherwise displaced by a new generation project. 
This approach is being evaluated now but has 
not yet gained acceptance [18]. Yet, using 
LACE requires system level knowledge and 
may involve arbitrary decisions over what is the 
marginal plant.  Altogether we see a lack of lack 
of consensus on how we should calibrate 
incentives for RE in liberalized markets to 
determine appropriate compensation and, 
ultimately, promote economic efficiency. To 
address the issues around valuation of 
incentives, we introduce a new way of looking 
at RE according to how its costs may be hedged 
to analyse the appropriate level of returns given 
the risks and impacts. This affords a better 
understanding of the financial performance of 
RE in a liberalised market settings, of how 
incentives should be calibrated to reward RE 
investments efficiently. 
 
3. METHODS, MODEL AND DATA 
The first step towards proposing appropriate 
calibration for RE incentives is to know the 
value derived from operating  RE in an 
integrated, liberalised traded market for 
electricity. This would require answering a 
number of questions. For example, from an 
investor in RE perspective, empirically, what 
returns were earned under the various incentive 
schemes offered in the EUs liberalized, traded 
electricity markets? Secondly, from the 
perspective of economic efficiency, 
incorporating the full impact of RE in liberalized 
markets, has the return provided to investors 
been generous? Thirdly, do such returns to RE 
investors embody all direct and indirect costs 
from the operation of renewable generation? 
And, lastly, as the priority dispatch of renewable 
electricity into an integrated liberalised system 
may make markets more volatile and reduce 
prices, how could be the impact in terms of 
system cost, exposure and economic efficiency 
appraised? These aspects are discussed below.  
 
3.1   RE in Liberalized Markets 
Setting the right incentives for RE in liberalized, 
traded markets for electricity presents many 
challenges. In the 1990s most programs to 
deregulate and liberalize electricity markets 
gave a prominent role to trading. Through the 
interaction of supply and demand, markets were 
balanced and reliability ensured, with the 
marginal price set by the most efficient plants, 
the CCGTs. In such markets, fossil fuel 
generators compete on short-run marginal costs 
in order to sell to a centralised grid which owns 
the high-voltage transmission systems and sub-
stations. In liberalised electricity markets 
wholesale prices for electricity are made half-
hourly, reflecting the requirements of the largest 
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users who are metered 48 times per day.  
Through system planning and the right mix of 
flexible and less flexible plants, the grid 
operators may use short-term balancing and 
trading markets to cover demand prediction 
errors or unplanned outages, while entering into 
longer-term contracts to avoid supply 
disruptions and ensure adequate reserve 
margins. 
Introducing RE into the above market 
structure and dynamics presents challenges as it 
cannot be dispatched on demand but generates 
when the wind blows or the sun shines. For this 
reason, renewables are given “dispatch 
priority”: when they are generating, other plants 
with flexible and controllable output must 
reduce their output. Dispatch priority creates 
short-term balancing costs for the grid and 
incumbents, plus long-term costs such as the 
need for grid connections and investment in 
more dispatchable generation as back-up. The 
average thermal efficiency of incumbent plants 
may be reduced and the frequency of unexpected 
outages and break-downs may grow. Such 
externalities need to be incorporated when we 
measure the value of RE. Setting incentive 
mechanisms for renewables (such as feed-in 
tariffs or feed-in premiums) while excluding the 
benefits (of not paying for the common resource 
of dispatchable back-up generation and grid 
management) mean the true returns and benefits 
to RE are under-estimated and, ultimately, 
resources wasted. 
 
3.2   The Value of Renewable Energy 
As discussed above, operators of RE plant 
receive an incentive price for what they generate 
but comparing the value of their revenues 
against the costs of investments does not tell full 
story.  Rather, the private return to investors 
should be compared with the total costs of RE 
schemes, including not just incentive prices but 
any indirect costs of created exposures. To value 
RE properly in a liberalized market setting, we 
employ option theory as has been applied to 
model and optimize flexible, dispatchable plants 
[19, 20, and 21]. The RE purchase obligation 
across the EU upon grid operators, supply 
companies and consumers means that, whenever 
the sun shines or the wind blows, output must be 
reduced and all other dispatchable plant must be 
re-prioritized or even shut-down. Typically, a 
renewable operator will enter into a long-term 
supply contract with a renewable aggregator or 
integrated utility resembling a contract for 
differences between the market price and the 
price paid through the feed-in tariff or premium. 
The difference between the value stream to the 
renewable operator from a feed-in tariff or a 
feed-in premium and the normal wholesale price 
of electricity faced by the purchaser of RE, 
creates an exposure for the buyer and ultimately 
society. Under most schemes if hourly prices 
exceed the tariff the renewable operator must 
return the excess [22]. Through applying option 
theory we may quantify the value of this 
exposure. 
In agreeing to take renewable electricity 
in which the buyer is liable for the difference 
between the market and incentive price, 
effectively a contract for differences, an 
exposure is created and ultimately imposed upon 
the greater system. This exposure theoretically 
could be hedged by purchasing a strip of put 
options (the right to sell) with strike prices equal 
to the feed-in tariff price. The theoretical price 
of the option represents the cost for accepting 
such risk by the purchaser, and ultimately borne 
by the system.  If market prices fall, the exposure 
arising from a contract for differences grows, 
but through using put options conferring the 
right to sell at the incentive price, a purchaser of 
RE could theoretically hedge the exposure 
because the price of the put option embodies this 
volatility. The price of the put option represents 
the cost for having to take RE under the purchase 
obligation ultimately borne by society’s 
stakeholders, as it is equal and opposite in value 
to neutralize the exposure.   
To price the exposure from the 
difference between market price and that of RE, 
through for example a feed-in tariff, we use put 
options with strike prices set at the price paid for 
such energy, as could be used to neutralize and 
off-set the cost of purchasing electricity above 
the market price. In summary, the combination 
of dispatch priority and incentive pricing 
enjoyed by renewable operators creates an 
exposure for the buyer and, ultimately, for the 
system or grid which may be priced and 
theoretically hedged using put options. Other 
approaches have been considered to quantify the 
exposure to RE, such as comparing it with the 
LCOE, but as already explained this excludes 
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any indirect costs of RE. One researcher has 
tried a statistical approach to value the contract 
for differences (CfD) against futures markets but 
lack of liquidity and risk aversion may render 
such results tentative [23].   
 
3.3   Data 
Turning to data requirements, for the years 2009 
through 2013, data were collected for the 
following: (i) support levels for RE for the 
majors countries of the EU; (ii) wholesale prices 
for electricity across within these countries; (iii) 
price volatility in the same countries; (iv) daily 
sun irradiation by countries; (v) average 
capacity factors for wind turbines and photo-
voltaic facilities and (vi) costs per installed MW 
of renewable investments. Data from the 
Council of European Energy Regulators 
(CEER) was used for support levels by country 
and technology, per MWh as summarized in 
Table 1 below.  
Table 1. RE incentives  
 
 
Comparing what was paid for RE versus the 
wholesale market price of electricity, data was 
taken at day-ahead frequency for these same 
countries of the EU from Bloomberg. Several 
sources were checked for sun irradiation [24]. 
Data from the International Energy Agency 
(IEA) and the US Department of Energy, Energy 
Information Agency (US DOE) were consulted 
for capacity factors of both wind and photo-
voltaic electricity generation [25 and 26]. Both 
official, EIA and IEA and commercial sources 
were examined for the price per installed unit of 
wind and solar capacity, with the World Energy 
Outlook for 2014 proving the most useful [27]. 
To adjust the time-value of the cash flows 
arising from renewable generation a weighted 
average cost of capital of 10% was assumed as 
it reflects the average opportunity cost of capital 
among Europe’s major integrated energy 
utilities (while the return on investment 
averaged at 8%). Given the nature of the cash 
flow arising from renewable electricity 
generation, a discussion of whether a different 
rate should be used follows below. To calibrate 
the option pricing model, day-ahead price 
volatilities were taken from Bloomberg. Since 
historic wholesale electricity price data at half-
hourly frequency is not readily available, a 
scalar adjustment was made to the option model 
calculations, based upon differences in value 
between day-ahead and half-hourly options to 
estimate the exposure which buyers of RE faced. 
Option strike prices were set at the various 
incentive prices as shown above.  Incentive 
prices minus the historic market prices together 
determine by how much the option has intrinsic 
value. The option pricing software DerivaGem, 
Version 3.00 was employed.  
4 MODEL SET UP AND RESULTS 
We begin by examining the returns earned by 
investors in RE using a return on capital 
employed measure, specifically:   
 
ROCE (%) = 
𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 𝑏𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑇𝑎𝑥
𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑑
 (1) 
 
Capital Employed is the capital required to 
purchase renewable generation capacity and 
excludes funding liabilities.  As operating costs 
of renewable plant are low for wind turbines, 
especially during the first ten years of operation, 
and even lower for photo-voltaic (estimated at 
just 1%), such costs were excluded from 
earnings. ROCE shows the value of a business 
and whether it can create value exceeding its 
WACC.  (To validate the ROCE results, we also 
extended the 2009 to 2013 results to 2029, 
twenty years, and computed an Internal Rate of 
Return comparing the initial investment against 
the historic and projected revenues. Assuming a 
twenty year life span for the investments, the 
IRR results resemble the ROCE results.) 
 To analyse the value in RE, we compute 
a ROCE using the total amount received for 
generated output by an owner/operator. Sellers 
of RE receive a combination of the wholesale 
market price for electricity, plus the incentive 
premium paid by buyer, while buyers of RE are 
exposed at half-hourly granularity to the 
difference between the incentive price and the 
wholesale market price of electricity. We have 
averaged the result over the five years of 
2009 - 2013 SOLAR PV
SOLAR 
OTHER
WIND 
OFFSHORE
WIND 
ONSHORE
Minimum 220.53€     68.04€      41.05€           41.05€          
Maximum 496.03€     290.90€    135.50€         224.80€        
Average 381.34€     177.34€    102.23€         92.60€          
RE Incentives for 
Belgium, France, 
Germany, Italy, 
Netherlands, and 
Spain (Euros MWh)
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available data and then compared it to capital 
employed. Summary results appear in table 2. 
 
 
Table 2. ROCE  
 
 
 
Our calculations show that returns to RE owners 
and operators were very generous. Solar photo-
voltaic technology earned the highest return on 
capital employed followed by on-shore wind 
energy. The average ROCE for solar photo-
voltaic exceeds 30%, while for on-shore wind 
generation the ROCE was also very high. In 
Italy, for example, the returns to solar and wind 
were spectacular. Across the EU only Spain 
made noteworthy investment in solar thermal 
technology and the ROCE results exceeded 
30%. Compared to the rate of 10% to discount 
the time value of future earnings, ROCE results 
greatly exceeded the assumed cost of capital. 
Given the guaranteed off-take, dispatch priority 
afforded to RE investors, the credit quality of 
counter-parties taking the generated electricity 
and the government backing to incentive prices, 
the generous terms provided to investors are 
surprising. As the relationship between 
incentive prices and ROCE is linear, cutting 
incentives in half would still have generated 
returns equal to, or exceeding, the WACC in all 
countries analysed. In summary, although the 
various programs across the EU were effective 
in getting RE plant built, the cost of incentives 
were economically inefficient offering supra-
normal returns for essentially risk-free 
investments.    
 We now turn to measuring the exposure 
created by the operation of RE and faced by its, 
grid operators, integrated utilities and ultimately 
society. Buyers of RE, aggregators and 
integrated utilities under dispatch priority face 
the exposure arising from having to purchase 
electricity at the difference between the RE 
incentive price and the traded wholesale price of 
electricity. To hedge such an exposure, buyers 
of RE could purchase a strip of half-hourly put 
options to neutralize what might be lost from 
having to purchase electricity above the 
wholesale traded market price. Even if such 
options were not tradable, the price of the option 
represents the cost for accepting the risk. At day-
ahead frequency, using the scalar adjustment 
noted in section 3.3 for five years, the prices of 
put options were computed using the standard 
put option model and parameters [28].   
 To appreciate the profitability for RE 
shown above, we quantify the externality per 
MWh of capacity from the operation of RE and 
compare it to what was earned per MWh of 
installed capacity. As in table 3 below, it would 
cost the buyers of RE on average nearly twice as 
much to hedge the exposure arising from the 
difference between the feed-in incentive prices 
to what the RE owner/operator received. For 
example, while the renewable operator with 
solar PV earned €342,100 per MW of capacity, 
it costs buyers of such RE €669,598 to hedge the 
exposure. Or for on-shore wind, the cost of the 
externality is the difference between €228,082 
and €441,827.  
Table 3. Revenues versus Hedging Costs 
 
As shown in table 3, the costs of hedging one’s 
exposure greatly exceed the gains from 
renewable operation. The result is intuitive: 
intermittency must be hedged for every half of 
the year while renewable operation is for only a 
small proportion, driven by the vagaries of the 
 COUNTRY  SOLAR PV 
 SOLAR 
THERMAL 
 WIND OFF-
SHORE 
 WIND ON-
SHORE 
BELGIUM
RE Owner/Operator Revenue 256,891€              236,124€              229,284€              
Cost to Buyer to Hedge Exposure 558,305€              494,240€              431,982€              
FRANCE
RE Owner/Operator Revenue 363,390€              311,525€              174,308€              
Cost to Buyer to Hedge Exposure 788,972€              632,533€              348,868€              
GERMANY
RE Owner/Operator Revenue 250,184€              217,322€              99,099€                
Cost to Buyer to Hedge Exposure 532,015€              451,584€              232,130€              
ITALY
RE Owner/Operator Revenue 503,184€              476,839€              
Cost to Buyer to Hedge Exposure 858,351€              946,254€              
SPAIN
RE Owner/Operator Revenue 483,132€              359,723€              223,374€              223,374€              
Cost to Buyer to Hedge Exposure 839,326€              617,290€              444,620€              375,802€              
THE NETHERLANDS 
RE Owner/Operator Revenue 195,819€              42,147€                223,345€              165,587€              
Cost to Buyer to Hedge Exposure 440,620€              86,489€                446,541€              315,923€              
AVERAGE
RE Owner/Operator Revenue 342,100€              200,935€              242,338€              228,082€              
Cost to Buyer to Hedge Exposure 669,598€              351,889€              493,904€              441,827€              
AVERAGE DIFFERENCE 70% 63% 71% 67%
AVERAGE ANNUAL REVENUE OVER FIVE YEAR PER MW OF CAPACITY 
VERSUS COST OF HEDGING THE CONSEQUENT EXPOSURE
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weather. The costs of hedging solar PV 
generation are greater in the Southern countries 
of Europe than those in the North due to the 
many more hours over which exposure is 
created. Although buyers of RE are only 
exposed to purchasing energy from solar 
facilities during day-light hours the higher 
incentives provided for the former makes the 
cost of hedging its exposure generally greater. 
The costs of hedging against exposures to 
renewables enhances the favourable returns 
enjoyed by RE generators. The RE operator 
imposes externalities, as measured through 
imposing hedging costs upon the greater market, 
enhancing his return significantly. If roughly 
one-half the portion of the costs imposed upon 
dispatchable generators and ultimately the 
society in hedging RE exposure were shifted to 
RE owner/operators their respective returns 
would be eliminated. Given the attractive 
returns provided to RE owner/operators and the 
externalities imposed upon buyers of their 
output, there would seem to be a strong 
empirical case for reducing the incentives 
provided.   
 
5 CONCLUSIONS 
In this work we have made two sets of 
observations based upon empirical research and 
analysis.  The first concerns the financial 
performance from operating or owning a RE 
facility; while the second draws attention to the 
significant externalities arising from RE. 
Recalling the four questions above, we 
calculated the financial performance of various 
renewable technologies across the key countries 
of the European Union using a ROCE approach. 
We have found that the ROCE results, as 
incentivized for the various RE technologies 
under the various EU schemes, were high. At a 
time when Europe’s major energy utilities were 
earning less than their cost of capital, investors 
in RE earned spectacular returns while taking 
little if any risk. Using option theory to quantify 
the exposure created for buyers of RE we have 
found that there were significant costs of nearly 
double what was earned from the operation of 
wind and solar facilities. Using the costs to 
society of having to hedge against the risk 
profile of RE rather than the already expensive 
incentive costs as measured in returns to RE 
investors, the full costs would be much greater.   
It has been suggested that the presence of 
renewables may lower prices and contribute to 
price volatility, because prices and volumes are 
generally correlated [29]. Further, RE may 
create system wide costs as more thermal plants 
are paid to be on standby or minimum stable 
generation, lest the wind stops blowing or clouds 
appear. From option theory, we can see that if 
electricity market were to become more volatile, 
this would make the cost of hedging such 
exposure greater. Further, with variable cost of 
operating RE practically zero, the operation of 
RE may depress electricity prices by increasing 
the spread between the feed-in premium or tariff 
and the market price; increasing the cost of 
hedging against such an exposure. Not only does 
RE impose costs upon incumbents, the system 
and ultimately society but, through growing in 
output, it becomes more profitable. In summary, 
although the European Union has been 
successful in getting RE built, the direct costs of 
incentivizing RE plus the indirect costs to 
society, have been expensive and difficult to 
justify from the perspective of economic 
efficiency.   
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